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To assess the quality of institutional develop-  tions. Second, thie  data strongly suggest that
ment (ID) work in recent Bank projects, and the  more experienced people tend to do bettcr ID
factors affecting that quality, Gray, Khaaiagala,  work. While experience and educational back-
and Moore reviewed thc design of 84 projects  ground are highly correlated, each appears to
approved by the Board in 1988. They found the  make an independent contribution to the quality
following.  of ID treatment. Third, country experience adds
considerably to the quality of ID work.
The Bank's record on ID is mixed. ID
treatment was judged good in 43 percenit  of the  These findings lead the authors to make
projects, adequate in 24 percent, and weak in 33  sev2ral recommendations. First, specialized
percent. ID treatment tended to be better in  public sector management divisions can be
investment projects -- particularly in inf'rastruc-  uselul in improving the Bank's ID work in
ture, energy, and human resources -- than in  adjustment and tcchnical assistancc loans, but
adjustment loans.  Among regions, Asia and  they are no substitute for expertise and sensitiv-
Africa had a larger percentage of well-designed  ity to ID concems  within the country depart-
loans than E.MENA  and lIAC.  ments themselves  (ideally Lhrough  the inclusion
of at least one ID specialist on Ihe staff of each
Ol' the people working on ID issues. 44  such department).  Second, Ihie Bank should
percent  v ere  technical  spccialists,  27  percenit  coniitnuC  eo  ctmphasize  scctor-specific  traininlg
Aere ecoinomii  ists,  18 perccit  were lawyers.  and experience -- particularly liie maniagement
finanicial  analyvsts,  project officers. or countrv  experience -- in hiiring  staff for ille sector divi-
ol'f'icers, anl(d  11 percent  were people  with  sions. Third, residenit missions should play  more
speciailized  ID training.  Consultanis played only  of a role in project design anid  supervisioni  than
a minior  role except in agricultural projects.  they do now. Fourth, greater emphasis on
project supervision is needed.  Few incentives
Several staff characteristics appear to affect  now exist for good supervision, and responsibil-
the quality of ID treatment in the design of Bank  ity for project outcomes appears to be weak.
projects.  First, technical and institutionial
specialists appear to do a beiter job than  econIo-  Finially,  tihC  Bank's best institutional work is
mists on average.  This  finding supports the view  done when managers are most committed to ID
thall  institutiollal  l  sis is a speciality distinct  goals.  Managers can improve the quality ol' ID
f'roIIm  economiics,  and that speciialized triainlinlg  --  work by givinig ciear signals -- throughi  hirinig
whether in a technical speciality  or in disciplines  practices, work assigniments,  policy papers,
such as public administraztion  or social sciences  speechies,  and (most important) reviews of'
other than CconoImnics  -- can imilprove  onie's ability  individual loans -- that ID is crucial to the Bank's
to analyze ins:itutions and design ID interven-  mission of promoting development.
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Institutional  D4 alopment  Work in the Bank:
A Review oi 84 Bank Projects
Introduction
Institutional  weakness is a  critical constraint to economic development.
The World Bank, and the development community more generally,  have become
increaaingly aware of the need for institutional  strengthening if projects are
to be succeesful and development is to be  mustained.  This awarene-s comes in
part from reviews of project resUlts by the Bank's Operations Fvaluation
Department (OED)  and others.  A recurrent theme of these reviews is that
project failure often results from inadequate  concern for the weak
institutional  capacity of the host government.  As noted in OED's most recent
Annual Review of Performance Evaluation, "in a large number of unsatisfactory
operations, the principal determinants  of performance  were institutional
In some cases, insntitutions  at the national and project levels  were weak, and
their capacity was overstretched by the Bank-supported operations.  Often,
difficulties  stemmed from  poor  management  . . . Other  difficulties  arose  when
project designs turned out to be based on an inadequate  understanding of the
surrounding culture, rural social and institutional  structures,  and behavioral
norrs . . These findings call for  more careful assessments of the
institutional aspects of proposed  operations."1
The goal of this paper is to review the design of recent Bank projects
to assess the quality of their institutional  development ("ID")  components and
the factors that may affect that quality.  A major focus is Bank staffing  and
organization, and the following questions are addressed:
1.  What is the quality of institutional analysis and ID components in
the design of current Bank projects?
2.  Who is now doing ID  work 'n Bank projects?
3.  What qualifications are needed for effective ID work?
4.  What impact does the Bank's organizational structure have on ID
work?
5.  What suggestions can be made to broaden and strengthen the ID work
in Bank projects?




To help anawer these questions, we selected a stratified sample of 74
Bank projects approved by the Board in 1988.  The sample was stratified by
region and sector to facilitate  region- or sector-specific comparisons. 2 The
year 1988 was chosen because  it reflects, as closely as possible, current work
and staffing patterns in the Bank.  The projects, chosen at random, represent
one-third of all the projects that went to the Board in that year.  As seen 'n
Table 1, the sample is composed primarily of investment loans, the heaviest
concentration being in infrastructure  and energy and agriculture.  Despite the
high visibility of adjustment loans,  they still represent a relatively small
percentage of total Bank loans and about the same percentage of total money
lent (Table  2).  Africa is the heaviest represented  of the regions,
particularly in structural  adjustment loans ("SALs")  and technical assistance
loans ("TALs").
Some of the most intractable  institutional  problems arise in  the core
macroeconomic management functions  of government, which are typically
addressed in SALa and TALs.  Because  of the smzll representation  of these
types  of  loans  i: the originRl  sample,  we  also  '.adied  the remaining  14 SALa
and  TALs  approved  in 1988 but not included in t.  . original  sample.  Thus,  our
total sample included  88 projects.  Of these, four fell out (three from the
original sample and one from  the additional SALs and TALs) during the course
of the study because of the unavailability of the task manager for interview.
Our  final  sample  thus  numbered  84,  as shown in Table 1.  Of these 84, 71 were
from our original stratified  sample, and 13 were additional SALs and TALs.
ID analysis
The treatment  of institutional  issues in the de ign of these 84 projects
was studied in depth.  First, the  main project document (President's  or Staff
Appraisal Report)  was analyzed  to determine the degree to which it addressed
ID-related issues.  Institutional  development impliec more than the mere
strengthening of organizations  that will facilitate project implementation  and
completion.  By institutions,  we mean specific  organizations (such  as a
ministry of finance,  a parastatal  or public enterprise) as well as
institutions in the broader and more fundamental sense, such as financial  and
commodity markets and the legal framework.  For each project we looked at the
treatment (including  both coverage  and quality of analysis) of both types of
institutions.  Among the institutional  topics studied  were the legal and para-
legal system; the internal  organization and distribution of functions in the
affected organization(s); inter-institutional  relationships;  physical and
financial capacity for project implementation;  personnel policies and reward
2  In other words, the numbers in each cell of Table 1 equal one-taird of
the total number of projects in  that region and sector category approved by the
Board in 1988.  It should be  noted  that the samplo  size was not large  enough to
permit region- and  sector-specific  conclusions.3
Table  1
Regional  and  Sector  Breakdown  of Sampie  Projects
number  of projects  chosen




Asia  Africa  East  America  Total
Original  Sample
Agriculture  5 (4)  7  3  3  18 (17)
Human  Resources  3  4 (3)  1  2  10  (  9)
Infrastructure  and  Energy  9(8)  7  3  4  23 (22)
Trade,  Finance,  and  Industry  4  4  3  3  14
Structural  Adjustment  (SAL)  0  3*  1  1  5
Technical  Assistance  (TAL)  0  3  0  1  4
Total  21 (19)  28 (27)  11  14  74  (71)
Additional  Projects
SAL  0  4  1  1  6
TAL  1  6 (5)  0  1  8 (7)
Total  1  10  (9)  1  2  14 (13)
TOTAL FINAL  SAMPLE  20  36  12  16  84
*,
The  Mali TAL  is  combined  with the  Mali SAL  in  the  sample  because  they  were
esssentially  one  operation,  done simultaneously  by the  same  team  with the  same
task  manager.4
Table  2
Total  Size  of  Loans  in the  Sample




Asia  Africa  East  America  Total
Original  Sample  (71)
Agriculture  498  229  203  414  1343
Human  Resources  176  78  54  18  326
Infrastructure  and  Energy  814  212  376  311  1712
Trade,  Finance,  and  Industry  355  712  478  1000  2545
SAL  - 220  150  100  470
TAL  - 43  0  27  70
Total  1842  1493  1261  1870  64'6
Additional  Projects  (13)
SAL  - 245  200  50  495
TAL  200  80  0  10  290
Total  200  325  200  40  785
TOTAL  FINAL  SAMPLE .84)  2042  1817  1461  1930  72505
systems; and competency and *kill levels in the institutional  environment.3
We also looked at the extent to  which the project document addressed the
question of political commitment  to the project (such  commitment being
essential to succeseful ID) and the quality and sensitivity  of the ID
components (much  as training and technical assistance) included in the project
itself (Box  1).  We were also interested in  any  discussion  of  how  the project
implementing unit ("PIUV)  related--both in the short and the longer-run--to
other entities in  the sector.  Finally, we looked carefully at whether the
project design was sensitive  to the absorptive  capacity of the recipient
organization; overoptimism and overambitious design can be as fatal to success
as neglect.  After reviewing the treatment of these various criteria in the
project documen t ,  we tentatively catsIorized  each project as either good,
adequate, or weak in its ID coverage.
These deak reviews  were then followed  by interviews with the task
manager of each project.  The main goals of the interviews  were twofold:
first, to discuss and reassess  the treatment of ID issues (and finalize  the
categorization) and second, to gather data on staff input into ID  work,
including  the job title, educational  background, career experience, and
organizational affiliation of each person  who contributed to the ID work on
the project.  The interviews also provided an opportunity to discuss Bank
structure, staffing, and incentives  with the practitioners, to get their views
on the factors  that affect ID work in the Bank.  The interview information  was
then combined  with the desk  analyses to create a comprehensive  data base on
the treatment of ID issues in projects and the sta f responsible for such
treatment.
Limitations of the methodologv
This  methodology  has several important  limitations  that should  be noted
at  the  outset.  First,  the  study  looks  only  at  the  design of the projects, not
at their outcomes.  While a good design  does  not  guarantee  a  good  proje-t,  we
3  This  list  of  criteria  follows  Tobelem,  "Institutional  Capacity  Analysis
System  to  Strengthening  of  Entities'  Capacity  to  Implement  Their  Work  Program",
draft, 4/5/87.
4  It should  be stressed  that the evaluations  covered  the treatment  of only
ID issues.  A "weak"  rating  does  not  imply  a  bad  project  overall,  but  rather  a
weak treatment  of ID issues.  On the other hand, institutional  issues often lie
at the heart of project success or failure.  OED notes, for example, that 'in
the great majority of [unsatisfactory  projects],  the principal determinants of
performance  were difficulties  with institutional  changes and reforms."  In some
cases, the projects "tended to be unduly complex, and ...  would have required
exceptional  leadership  to  succeed." In  others, "understanding  seems  to have  been
inadequate  of the intricate  institutional  arrangements (includi;g  the structure
of property rights)  prevailing in the areas covered."  It is clear  that careful
analysis of  institutional needs, both in the narrow and tho broa  sense, is
important to project success.  OED, Annual Review of Evaluation Results, 1988,
pp. 22-24.6
Box  1.  8g.  Cr&tori&  for Judeiuci  ID  Treatment
-lugcl  and  egaaleosi  slatsa:  Dose the design effectively consider
the  project's  need  for  changes  in statutes  or other  "rules  of the
game"?
-int.mO.  gruaniati-Aj  XeT tho  project  designed  to  ensure  that  leac
izpli_enting  organizations  have  the  appropriatd  structure  to  carry
out  their  mandate(s)?
_*n.r-~gitut~9g3~  rg1MIAWAMiW  Projects  often  affect  more  than
one  organization.  Does  the project adequately  identify  those
organizations  or parts  of organizations  to  be affected  by the  loan?
-Dh7siea  and  fin"nciAI  gaRDaitZs  Is there  an  adequate  asseesment
of  the  physical  and  financial  requirements  for  various  stages  of  the
project  cyclO?
-22Nersonn 2gcigicis  and  rgward  svaeasm  Does  the  design  consider  the
a propriateness  of the match  between recrultment  and  incentIve
policies  and  staff  responsibilities?
-Maateg:cw  aid skJIl Lsyglss  Does the design  consider  whether
sxisting  skill  levels  are  adequate  for  implementation?
-country  coamitmentt  Has care  been  taken  that  adequate  political  and
bureaucratic  commitment  will  exist  beyond  the  stac,  of  oi
fund$na?
-rI  comoononts  in tbe proiect:  Given the  Identification  of
institutional  needs,  does  the  project  design  provide  for  specific  and
appropriate activities to  amelicrate potential implementation
bottlenecks?7
uuspent a  poor design has little chance of succes. 5 Recent projects were
chosen because they reflect current conditions in the Bank.  However, it  would
be very useful to revisit them again in 5-10 years to review how they were
accually implemented  and what impact  they had.
Second, the review  of ID design focuses  only on the major Board
document--the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR),  or the President a  Report if no
SAR was available.  While this may not reflect all the work done on a  project,
it is the document that the Board sees and upon which final approval is based,
thus it should review all significant  elements of project design.
Furthermore, in each case the document review was followed up with an in-
depth interview  of the task manager.
Third, the data on staffing include only those people who participated
on Bank missions, in most cases appraisal  missions.  Consultants or others  who
did background work are not included.
Finally, the work necessarily involved subjective  judgments concerning
the quality of the treatment of ID in the projects studied.  Many of the
conclusions are opinions, not proven facts.  At least there were three
somewhat independent judgments (one from each author) in each case rather than
just  one, and rarely was there any disagreement among the three.
Findnags
What is the aualitv of institutional  work in Bank nroiects?
Overall the record is mixed.  Of the basic sample of 71 loans, 44% were
judged  to have a good treatment of ID issues,  while 24% were judged adequate
5  Again quoting  from OED  (pg. 26),  "an explicit assessment at the
appraisal stage of the adequacy of institutional  arrangements  will establish a
sounder  basis for project implementation.  Such an assessmer  ought to include
both a judgment of the project'l need for a specific form oL organization and
a judgment  of the absorptive  capacity  of the relevant institutions."  Later, in
its  discussion  of long-term  *ustainability,  OED states (pg.  35) "both  the Bank's
regional  staff and evaluation officers have  emphasized the  importance  for
sustainability of decisions made  at the  preparation, design, and appraisal
stages.  In these projects the design issues concern not only the engine'3ring
and technical aspects  of projects,  but also the institutional  and  human capital
aspects."  OED  strongly recommends "that the Bank establish the necessary
framework  for  carrying  out  institutional analysis  in  all  its  operations.
Immediate actions needs to be taken in this regard" (pg.  37).8
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and 32% were judged weak.6 Tables 3 and 4 show the ratings of loans by sector
and region, respectively.  The quality of ID treatment apvears to be better in
investment  projects, particularly in human resources  and infrastructure  and
energy, than in adjustment loans (whether  SALS or sector adjustment loans--
6  These overall results are similar to those recorded in other studins
of project-related  ID  work.  In its  1988  evaluations  of  comvleted  projects,  OED
judged 35 percent of the projects evaluated to have had substantial success in
ID,  41 percent to have had partial success,  and 24 percent  to have accomplished
very little in this area  (OED,  pg. 58).  The degree of success  appears to have
depended at least in part on the project's understanding of local institutions
and on the  care and realism evident in the design of technical assistance
components--two  aspects  of  project  design  covered in  this  analysis. For another
study of  completed  projects  that  arrives  at  similar  results,  see  D.  W.
Brinkerhoff, "Institutional  Analysis  and Institutional  Development:  A Survey of
World Bank Project  Experience," (draft,  October 1989).  In  analyzing  the reasons
behind successful institution-building  in  a sample  of Bank projects,  this study
stresses similar  themes to ours--the importance  of country commitment,  quality
of management and technical staff, favorable bureaucratic incentives, and a
stable environment.9
Table  3
Sector  and  Rating  of  Sample  Projects
- in percent
Weak  Adequate  Good  Total
Agriculture  35  29  35  100
Human  Resources  23  23  56  100
Infrastruct-re/Energy  23  23  55  100
Trade/Finance/Industry  29  29  43  100
(SAIL  67  17  17  100)
SAL  - original  5  100  0  0  100
(-total  11  73  9  18  100)
TAL  - original  4  25  25  50  100
(-total  11  27  27  45  100)
TOTAL  - original  71  32  24  44  100
(-  total  84  33  24  43  100)
- Numbers  may  not  add  correctly  due  to rounding.10
Table  4
Region  and  Rating  of Sample  71  Projects
- in  percent
Weak  Adequate  Good  Total
Asia  21  26  53  100
Africa  33  15  52  100
EMENA  36  36  27  100
LAC  43  29  29  10011
SECALs).  Over half of the infrastructure,  energy, and human resource projects
were categorized as good and less than one-quarter as weak; in contrast, all
of the 5 SALs in the original sample (three-quarters  of the expanded sample of
11) and two-thirds of the SECALs were categorized  as weak in their ID
treatment.  Ideally,  SALs and SECALs should aim to strengthen both economic
policies &ad economic management in the borrowing countries.  Even if SALs and
SECALs deal primarily with policy change, it is still important to analyze the
institutional  setting in which such policy change is to be implemented  to
judge  the feasibility  and *ustainability  of the program.  For example, revenue
increases should not be mandated without some understanding of the capacity of
the gov-rnment to collect them.  Similarly, cuts in the civil service wage
bill and other public expenditures should not be a condition of a  SAL without
some understanding  of the civil service and the expenditure  planning and
budgeting systems.  Policy changes that ignore  the institutional  underpinnings
are unlikely to last and may even have perverse outcomes.  When analyzing ID
treatment in SALs, we did not look exclusively for specific ID components
(which  are often not included in SALs) but rather for an understanding of the
institutional  setting and a sensitivity  to the importance  of country
commitment and long-term sustainability. 7
Half of the technical assistance loans were judged to be good, while
one-fourth  were rated  weak and one-fourth adequate.  A recent OED study of 20
earlier free-standing  technical assistance  projects concludes that overall
"the record of institutional  development is rather weak . . . If a program is
to be realistic,  project identification,  design, and implementation  require a
greater level  of commnitment  and a greater depth of political and economic
understanding  of the recipient country than were evident in the Bank's
relationship  with bor.owers in  most of the TA projects studied."  As discussed
later, some  of the gocd TA projects in this study appear  to incorporate some
of the lessons learned from earlier failures.
on a regional baais, Asia and Africa had a larger  percentage of good
loans,  while Europe and Middle East 4EMENA) and Latin  America (LAC)  had the
highest concentration of weak loans.  However,  Asia had no SALs or SECALs,
while six of Africa's 27 projects were SALs or SECALs;  thus, Africa's
achievement is particularly noteworthy.
The coverage and quality  of analysis varied among the ID subtopics used
for evaluation.  Most of the projects (83  percent) had a good analysis of the
7  For further discussion of the weaknesses of ID work in SALs, see B.
Nunberg, "Review of Public Sector Management Issues in Structural Adjustment
Lending," Country Economics Department,  May 22, 1989.
a  It should be noted, however, that an earlier study using the  same
methodology done on all LAC projects in FY88 and  the first half  of FY89 came up
with a somewhat better record for LAC, indicating  that our sample of one-third
of the projects  was not a fully accurate reflection  of the whole.  See Richard
J. Moore, "Review of Treatment of Institutional  Development (ID) Issues in LAC
Projects Presented  to the  Board  Between  July 1987  and  December 1988,"  LATHR,  May
30, 1989.12
internal organization and distribution of functions in the affe-ted
organization.  Coverage of physical and financial capacity for project
implementation and of country commitment  was also strong in most projects (76
and 73 percent, respectively).  Of all the criteria,  personnel policies and
reward systems had the weakest coverage.  Only 32 percent of the projects were
considered  good in this category,  while almost half were considered  weak.  The
ratings  were more evenly distributed in the other categories--the legal and
para-legal system, inter-institutional  relationships, competency and skill
levels, and the quality of the ID components in the lending package.  Slightly
more than one-half of the projects were judged  good in these categories,  with
the rest considered weak or adequate.
Who is  now doine ID  work in bank prolectS?
The sample  of 71 projects had 150 people working on ID issues.9 Of
these, 44 percent were technical specialists,  27 percent were economists, 3
percent were lawyers, 15 percent were financial analysts,  project officers, or
country  officers, and 11 percent were people with more specialized  ID job
descriptions (such  as "public sector  management specialist"  or "technical
assistance  officer").
The  characteristics  of ID practitioners differed according to the type
of project.  As expected, ID  work in projects in infrastructure  and energy and
human resource was done primarily by technical specialists,  while ID  work in
SALs was dominated by economists (with  a  significant  input from formal
institutional specialists in the Africa region).  ID  work in agriculture and
trade, finance,  and industry  was done by both economists and technical staff.
The only type of project with a major involvement  of formal institutional
specialists  was the technical assistance  project.
Contrary to popular conception, consultants had a minor role in the
direct preparation of the ID components  of these Bank projects.  Of the 150 ID
people identified,  77 percent were Bank staff, while 23 percent were
consultants.  The only sector that relied  heavily on consultants for ID work
was agriculture.
What factors affect  the oualitv  of the desian of ID components in a
oroiect?
Many factors  have an influence  on the quality of ID design.  We touch
very briefly on two rather obvious and overarching  ones--type of project and
country environment--before  turning to the primary  topics of this paper--Bank
staffing and organization.
9  When analyzing the contribution of various individuals to the ID work
of a  project,  we wanted  to  distinguish  those  with a  major  contribution  from  those
with only a  minor contribution.  We did  this by  giving tha former (including  the
task  manager) a weighting of  one while  giving the latter  a  weighting of only .3.
All personnel-related statistics in this report reflect that weighting.13
1.  TYPL OF PROJ3CT.
It is no accident that projects in certain sectors tend to have better
ID treatment than projects in other sectors.  Energy and infrastructure
projects tend to be more "self-contained",  and the institutional issues tend
to be more standard from country  to country.  Although ID issues in human
resource projects are usually  more complex and less standard than those in
energy and infrastructure,  one might expect people working in the social
sectors to look carefully at management and human resource issuee.  SALs tend
to involve the most complex institutional  issues.  They address programs and
policy processes that tend to cut across many organizations,  and they deal
with the central institutions  of government, for which there are fewer
"recipes".  Furthermore, they often take place in a  highly politically charged
atmosphere.  Technical assistance loans  that accompany SALs share  the same
difficult environment,  but they should  be expected to look  with depth and
quality at institutional issues,  given that these issues are their core
concern.
2  COUNTRY ENVIRONMNT.
The country environment also affects the treatment of ID issues in Bank
projects.  First, it influences  the agenda of Bank priorities.  In many
African countvies, institutions  are so weak that ID is easily accepted as high
priority.  In some Latin American countries, in contrast,  macroeconomic
instability  tends to dominate other problems on the Bank's agenda.  Second, it
influences  the degree of access  of Bank staff to the inner workings of
institutions.  In each region  we noticed a slight negative correlation between
size of borrower and quality of ID work.  This is probably due both to the
Bank's higher leverage in smaller  countries and to the smnaller  size and thus
lower degree of complexity of the institutions  in those countries.  Both
factors  make institutions somewhat  more accessible  and comprehensible for Bank
staff.
The extent of the Bank's own previous experience in the country is also
likely to affect the quality of its ID work, because of the "learning curve"
involved in getting to know the intricacies  of local institutions.  In several
cases in our sample, for example, task managers were able to point to
successful institutional interventions  in previous Bank projects in the
particular country and sector, and their positive impact on current ID
analysis and design.  In some cases, institutions  had been built up slowly
over ten or more successive  Bank projects.  In contrast, one of the weakest
SALs from an institutional  perspective  was in a country in which the Bank had
only begun to get involved  again after an absence  of many years.
10  Others have also noted how the degree of "specificity"  of a task, or
the  existence  of  a  "blueprint approach", eases  the  task  of  institutional
development.  See  A.  Israel,  Institutional  Development.  Incentives  to
Performance, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987, and D. W. Steedman, "The
Institutional  Dimensions  of Investment  Lending:  Education and Power Projects in
FY87-88."14
Table  5
The Importance  of  Educational  and  Job  Specialization
Percentage  of ID  workers
with particular  specializations:
Technical  Institutional
Economists  Specialists  Specialists  Lawyers  Other  Total
Original  Sample  of 71
Weak  47  24  9  5  16  100
Adequate  24  58  3  0  15  100
Good  17  49  16  3  15  100
Total  27  44  11  3  15  100
All  22 SALs/TALs
Weak  45  4  29  8  14  100
Adequate  26  28  16  8  22  100
Good  28  3  54  5  iO  100
All  Other  Projects
Weak  48  31  0  3  18  100
Adequate  22  60  3  0  15  100
Good  19  55  10  2  14  10015
3.  sTAFF CARACTZRZSTZCS.
A major goal of this study  is to assess the impact on the quality of ID
work of several staff characteristics--including  educational background and
job title, prior ID-related experience in the sector, and prior experience in
the country.  Unfortunately, it is difficult to untangle the unique
contribution of each of these characteristics  because they (especially  the
first two) tend to be highly correlated  with each other.  In particular, the
Bank's technical experts tend to have more experience in institution  building
than staff in the other job categories (whether  economist, financial analyst,
institutional specialist,  country officer, etc.).
Educational background,
In general, the data suggest that educational background and job title
are correlated with the quality of ID treatment in project design.  (Because
job title is almost synonymous  with educational background--especially in the
major job categories such as economist, technical specialist, institutional
specialist, and lawyer--these  two characteristics are grouped together for
purposes of analysis.)  Table S shows the percentage of ID workers with
particular specializations  for the original sample of 71 projects, the
expanded sample of 22 SALs and TALs, and the 62 sector  projects.  In all
cases, the ID work in the weaker projects involved a higher percentage  of
economists than in the adequate or good projects.  In contrast,  the better ID
work in investment  projects was dominated by technical specialists,  while the
better SALr and TALs had large input from institutional  specialists (with
backgrounds in public administration  or the social sciences other than
economics).  These patterns remain even if the sample is subdivided  still
further  by individual sector.
These data tend to support  the view that institutional  analysis is a
specialty distinct from economics, and that specialized  training--whether in
technical specialties or in disciplines such as public administration or the
social sciences  other than economics--can improve one's ability to analyze
institutions  and design ID intervantions.  In evaluating the impact of
educational background, however,  one must also consider the impact of
experience because of the high correlation of the two variables.
ID-related sector  exRerienc.
The data strongly suggest  that more experienced people tend to do better
ID work (Table  6).  Of the original sample  of 71 projects, the average ID
worker in a1 ,roject  with a weak ID rating had 7 years of ID-related
experience,  while analogous experience levels in the adequate and good
projects were 13 and 18  years, respectively.  If SALs and TALs are separated
from sector projects (because  of the very different characteristics of each),
the same pattern holds.  In both subcategories, the average years of ID
experience per ID worker for the good projects was double that for the weak
11  We included as ID-related  experience any previous work that directly
involved institutional  analysis  or line-management  responsibility.16
Table  6
The Importance  of Relevant  ID  Experience
Average  years  of ID  experience  per ID  worker
(Average  number  of ID workers  per  project):
Original  Sample  All 22  All  other
of 71  SALs/TALs  projects
Weak  7.1  4.1  8.1
(1.9)  (2.2)  (1.8)
Adequate  13.4  6.5  14.2
(2.1)  (3.3)  (2.2)
Good  18.2  9.6  19.0
(2.3)  (3.2)  (2.2)
Total  13.5  6.3  14.7
(2.1)  (2.7)  (2.1)17
projects.  Furthermore, if  the projects are subdivided still further into
individual sector subcategories, the mame pattern holds.  In all cases, the ID
workers in good projects had significantly  more ID-related  experience than
those in weak projects.
An noted above, drawing a meaningful conclusion from this analysis is
complicated by the high correlation referred to earlier between specialization
and experience.  The Bank has relatively few inexperienced  technical
mpecialists and relatively few economists (particularly  macroeconomists)  with
long years of ID-related  experience.  We know from  Tables 5 and 6 that good
sector projects involve  a relatively high percentage of experienced technical
specialists,  while weaker sector projects involve fewer of them.  For SALs
and TALa, the institutional  specialists tend to have greater ID-related
experience, and more involvement  by them is correlated  with better ID
treatment.  Whether its  the specialized background or the years of ID-related
experience--or  both--that makes the difference is  difficult to tell.
There is some evidence, however, that experience is a major contributor
in and of itself,  at least in the sectors.  If we take a subsample  of only
technical specialists involved  in ID work on infrastructure  and energy
projects 2--thus eliminating the impact of sector or educational background,
there still appears to be a correlation  between quality of ID work and amount
of ID-related experience.  The technical specialists  working on the weak
projects had an average of  11 years of relevant experience,  while those
working on the adequate and good projects had relevant  experience of 16 and 22
years respectively.  A similar pattern holds for economists  working in
agricultural  projects, where the average experience per ID worker in weak,
adequate, and good projects  was 1.4, 7.2, and 11.8 years, respectively.
There is also some evidence that educational background/job  title is a
contributor in and of  itself,  particularly in SALs and TALs.  If  we lessen the
potential contribution  of experience by eliminating all SAL. and TALs with
highly experienced ID  workers,13 the good SALs and TALs still have a
significantly higher representation  of institutional  specialists (70 percent
as opposed to only 27 percent for the weak projects).
It is interesting  to note that the characteristics  of ID workers seem to
matter more than the total number of ID workers per project.  This number
(shown  in parentheses in Table 6), though positively correlated  with rating,
varies little between any of the categories.
12 Infrastructure  and  energy  was  the  only sector  with  a large  enough  sample
of any single type of specialist to be able to make a meaningful comparison
between weak, adequate, and good projects.
13  Here defined as all projects whose ID  workers have average ID-related
experience of 10 years or more.18
Table  7
The  Importance  of Country  Experience
Average  years  of country  experience  per  ID  worker:
Original  Sample  All 22  All  other
of 71  SALs/TALs  projects
Weak  1.2  .6  1.4
Adequate  2.5  .6  2.6
Good  3.0  .9  3.119
Country exoerience.
Experience working with the borrowing country is also correlated with
the quality of ID treatment in project design (Table  7).  The average years of
country experience per ID worker for good projects (whether  sector projects or
SALs/TALs)  was more than double that for  weak projects.
Both country experience and ID-related  experience were much lower for
SALe and TALe that for sector projects.  We believe this is because staff
working on these types of loans tend both to be younger and to rotate jobs
mc-e rapidly than technical sector staff.  It has  been suggested that the
small  amount  of  average  country  experience  for  SALs  and  TALs  might  be
influenced  to  some  extent  by the fact  that  1988  projects  were prepared during
and just after the reorganization,  when many people changed jobs.  However,
there is little  reason to presume that the reorganization affected SAL/TAL
staff more  than sector staff.  Moreover, the interviews  did not reveal
extensive disruption in the SALs and TALs.
Sensitivity  to  institutional  concerns.
We found  in  our interviews  that particular  task managers had an
intangible quality of personality,  partly  but  not  wholly  related  to  experience
and educational background, that seemed  to make them particularly sensitive to
the institutional  concerns in their projects.  These people seemed to be
particularly committed  to the substance  of their work, anu they realized
intuitively  that institutional  development ie necessary for project
sustainability  and long-term  economic development.
Team aporoach.
Institutional  concerns--particularly  in SALs and TALs--seem  to be
addressed  most thoroughly when at least  two and preferably more people with
different backgrounds and points of view work on the project together.  The
best SALs in the sample were accompanied  by TALs, with the two projects being
done in tandem and sharing many of the same staff.
4  ANAGENEWT  SUPPORT
The  quality  of  ID  treatment  in  project  design  is  strongly  influenced  by
the degree of support  given to ID work by management,  particularly the next-
in-line  managers, typically division chiefs.  A manager's overt concern with
and emphasis on long-term institution-building  is reflected not only in the
day-to-day work of his or her staff on particular projects, but more
fundamentally in the initial decisions  on staffing and on Bank strategy in the
borrowing countries.  Not all managers show equal commitment to ID issues;
variation in managerial commitment was clearly  noticeable in the interviews.
It  was reflected in the design of job  title and content in each division
(particularly  each Country Operations  division--COD),  the choice of staff to
fill each job, the tasks (projects,  economic and sector work--ESW) pursued,
and the treatment of ID issues in each task.20
Box 3.  K.enye  Third Population Project
Kenya has one of the highest population growth rates in the world.
This  project, approved in mid-1988  for SDR  9  million  (US $12.2
million equivalent), aims to  promote the demand for family planning
services  in Kenya and  to increase the supply of such services. It
attempts to mobilize and coordinate public and NGO resources to
expand  both public information  and  education  about  family  planning
and  the  supply  of  contraceptives.
Tho  project  is  a  good  example  of  institutional  analysis  in
project design.  It  focuses  on  ensuring  political  commitment  and  on
strengthening  lead institutions  and  their linkages  with  other actors
(including  NGOQ) in  the sector. There  is  an acute  sensitivity  to the
cross-cutting institutional setting In which the various agencies
interacts and to the need  for  proper  placement  of  lead institutions
to command legitimacy  and authority.  The good ID analysis stems in
part from long involvement of both the Bank and the project team
itself in the country and sector.  The Bank has played a critical
role  in  the  long-term development of  tte  National  Council  for
Planning and Development (NCPD).  From earlier assistance with a
strong project focus, the Bank has assisted ?NCPD  in increasLng its
role in the policy environment.
The  staff  working on  the  project have  excellent  technical
backgrounds and long  experience in  both the sector and the country.
The project took several years to prepare, due in part to careful
work to  build  consensus  and  political  support. The concern  for  long-
term sustainability is evident throughout.  It may be paying off--
Kenya's efforts at population  control appear  to  be showing initial
signs of real success, far beyond expectations  even one  year ago.
I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
5.  ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
Sector  nroiects
organizational structure does not appear to be much of an issue for ID
work in the sectors.  The country focus provided through the Bank's 1987
reorganization  gives the staff in  each Sector Operations division (SOD)  the
means to focus on country-specific institutional  issues over an extended
period.  SODs  tend to employ technical  experts with extensive ID-related
experience, and the data presented earlier indicate  that these experts are
likely  to give good treatment to institutional  issues in their projects.
Furthermore, the same staffing patterns  exist in the technical departments,
although the specific country focus (and  thus the long-term  country21
experience)  may be somewhat  harder to maintain because of the many competing
demands made on TD stafi from various country departments.
SALs/TALs
Organizational issues  are somewhat  more problematic in  the case of SALh
and TALs, because of the wide range and enormou& complexity of the
institutional issues that can a&ise.  At present Africa and LAC have units in
their respective technical departments devoted to public sector management,
while Asia and EMENA have no such specialized  units (although  one in the
Technical Department (TD)  division in EMENA is given explicit responsibility
for PSM activities).  Because  most of the projects in our sample of 22
SALc/TALc were  in Africa, it is somewhat difficult  to generalize our findings
to the Bank at large.  In Africa, the SALe and TALs that were either  managed
by or used staff  from the Africa PSM division tended to be  stronger  in their
treatment of ID issues than those that did not.  The best results came in the
few  cases where an ID specialist  was located in a COD and either managed the
loan (in  the case of TA loans) or worked closely with the country economist
who managed the loan (in  the case of SALs), and where the experts from  the
African PSM division were active participants.  In these cases strong ID
expertise combined  with strong  managerial commitment resulted in excellent ID
treatment in project design.
Use of resident  missions
In several projects, resident  mission staff made valuable contributions
to the high quality of institutional  design.  Their day-to-day  presence in the
borrowing country led to more thorough country knowledge,  experience, and
continuity than would have been possible through mission work alone.
Consultants vs. in-house staff.
The ratio of consultants  to in-house staff  did not appear to have an
impact  on the quality of ID treatment in our sample of projects.  All three
categories of projects averaged about  the same percentage (approximately  23
percent) of consultants in total ID staff.
Recomaendations for Action
Organizational Structure
1.  SPECIALIZED  UNITS
Our findings support the view that specialized  public sector  management
divisions can be useful in improving  the Bank's  work on institutional
development, particularly in regions (such  as Africa) with many adjustment and
technical assistance loans.  They insure a certain degree of sensitivity and
attention to institutional  issues, and they bring khowledge and experience to
bear in analyzing ID problems and suggesting ID interventions.  The ideal role
for such a division is as a locus of specialized  expertise in a range of
specific institutional issues,  particularly issues of macroeconomic
management--such  as civil service  reform, tax administration, public22
Box 4.  SAL., TALs, and Inastitutional  Development
Nowhere is tho need for careful consideration of institutional
isiues  *oro evident  than in tho  policy-based  approach of structural
adjustment  lending.  Because  policy-based  lending  cuts  across
institutions  and  generally  requires  several  institutions  to  cooperate
in implementation,  great care  must  be taken  in assuring  attention  to
institutional capacity.
The guinea Xconomic Manageamt  Support Project (EMSAP) and the
Central African Republic  Uconoaic  Management Project  (ZMP) show
careful  concern  for  the  institutional  support  needs  of  their
respective cospanion SALs.  Among other things, both  TALe  aim to
strengthen core ministries (in  such areas as  planning, investment
programming, fiscal and debt management) and to  promote efforts at
civil service reform.  in both cases, project design suggests a
strong "learning  curve" from  prior Bank operations (including  prior
failures) in the countries.  They raflect a concern that policy
refor-  outpace  neither  the  institutional  capacity  or  the  government'  s
commitment to impl-ment it.  The technical assistance, training,
studies,  and other  support  in  each  project  are  closely  integrated  and
are  carefully  designed  to create  indigenous  capacity  beyond the life
of  the  project.  For  ixample, rather than  depend on  long-term
technical advisors to ministers, short-term technical  advisors are
to be integrated into a unit with carefully assigned  counterparts.
The careful treatment of ID in  project design in thess two cases
reflects  strong managerial  commitment and staffing.  Both tasks are
managed (both  luring  design  aad  supervision)  in  the  COD (by  a  country
officer  and  a  techuical  assistance  specialist,  respectively)  and  draw
heavily  on  the  African  and/or  PPR  public  sector  management  divisions.
Both  were designed contemporaneously  with  the preparation of SALs,
with key staff participating in both loans.
expenditure planning and budgeting, debt management--of relevance to SALs and
TALs.
2.  COUNTRY DEPARTMENTS
However, a special unit in the Technical  Department is no substitute for
expertise and sensitivity  within the country  departments,  where control over
the ultimate design of lending  projrams lies.  Ensuring attention to
institutio.tal  issues--through  proper staffing  and incentives--within  the
country departments is critical both to proper design and to effective follow-
through in institution  building.  The rationale for  the Bank's 1987
reorganization  was to give country focus to strategy formulation.  For the
Bank to have a long-term impact on institutional  development, ID goals need to
be fully integrated into its country strategies.23
Ensuring sensitivity  to institutional  issues is  more difficult in the
country operating  divisions (CODs)  than in the sector  operating divisions
(SODs).  It can be accomplished in the SODs by maintaining a  staff of
experienced and broad-baszd  technical  experts.  Analogous experts--combining
broad-basied  sector knowledge and experience--do not typically exist in the
CODs,  which are staffed primarily by relatively young economists  and country
officers.  As noted above, institutional  work appears to be the weakest in the
Bank's adjustment lending (particularly  SALst  not accompanied  by TALs).  In
part this stems from  the lack  of experionco and interest  of many macro-
economists in Institutional issues.  Yet the institutional  challenges in
central institutions  of government typically covered by adjustment loans are
no less Important,  indeed they are probably more important,  than the analogous
challenges in investment  projects.  An increase in the quality of the Bank's
institutional  work in its adjustment and technical assistance lending  will
contribute to long-term *ustainability  of policy reform.
The best organizational  means to achieve this in our opinion is to
increase  the number of institutional specialists (with  jobs titled
accordingly) in the country dopartments (probably  in the CODs or possibly in a
separate unit within the CDz).  Their role would be to design and manage ID-
related ESW and TA loans and to advise other staff in the CD on institutional
issues.  In doing their work, they would draw heavily on expert PSM staff in
the technical departments  and PRE (Policy,  Research, and External  Affairs), as
well as external consultants (including  specialists  from institutes  of
management and policy analysis in developing countries).  Because  of the
staff-intensity  of TA loans,  they might need day-to-day  assistance from an
operations assistant.  This model has been followed quite successfully in a
few  divisions in  Africa and LAC.
Some CODs use country  officers to do Institutional  analysis and manage
TA loans.  This is an alternativ-  model that has the advantage  of keeping an
ID focus in the COD, but has the disadvantage that ID  work can take a
secondary role to the other day-to-day demands of a  country officer.  It also
tends to discourage specialization  in ID, because the country officer stream
draws from such a wide range of backgrounds.  Still, this approach is
preferable to no focus  on ID at all, and it may be the most feasible  one in
the short run given the culture of the Bank.
3.  RESIDENT MISSIONS.
Institutional  work could be enhanced lf the resident missions played a
larger role in project design and supervision  than they now do.  Indeed, some
people believe that significant  decentralization of the Bank's operations away
from Washington into the field is the only way to heighten the Bank's long-
term impact on institutional  development.  To begin strengthening  the role of
resident missions would in most cases require an addition of at least  one
higher-level staff person to the resident  mission.  This person would have an
integral  role in both project design and supervision (particularly  for
technical assistance projects and other projects with strong inatitution-
building components).24
4.  CENTRAL UNITS
Several central  units in the Bank are heavily involved in the area of
institutional  development.  The Public Sector Management and Private Sector
Development division (CKCPS)  in the Development Economics Department, PRE,
carrion out a  mixture of specialized  operational support, policy work,
research, and training.  it has bmen and should continue to be a center of
innovation,  startiAg now initiatives  and "spinning" them off when  appropriate.
It shoul.d  continue to serve a coordinating function,  bringing together the
many groups and individuals in the Brank  working  otl  ID issues to share
experiences and learn from each other.  Its internal  training rol- in likely
to increase in the future (see  discussion on training below).
The *xistence of CZCPS need not deter other divisions in PPR from
focusing  on institutional  issues in their area of specialty.  For example, ID
is a critical issue in  macroeconomic management, in  budget and tax
administration, in customs administration, and in the financial sector, not to
mention in the management of sectoral  policies and institutions.
The Coordination and Development Administration  division in the Economic
Development Institute (SDI)  is also dedicated to institution  building.  It is
involved in training policy makers in borrowing countries in principles and
techniques of public administration and long-term institutional  development.
Its curront mandate appears to be quite clear and appropriate.
Another central unit with a  potentially strong role in ID work in the
Bank is the legal  department.  Lawyers from this department  were very useful
in helping analyze and reform the legal framework in several  of the projects
In the sample.  Continued involvement  of this type can be encouraged by
placing more emphasis on substantive  operational support in  the work programs
of the lawyers in the department.  It is encouragin;  to note that the legal




Our results suggest  that the Bank should continue  to place major
emphasis on sector-specific  trainirg and experience--particularly  line
management experience--in  hiring staff for the sector divisions.  This
expertise is clearly a  great strength of the Bank.  One potentially serious
problem is the imminent  retirement of a large portion of the Bank's technical
experts.  Some 70 percent of the Bank's  technical experts  will reportedly be
eligible for retirement  within the next 5 years.  Hopefully the Bank will take
care to replace these experienced  technical experts with equally qualified
staff.25
SALc  SECALs. and TA oroiects
If institutional  development is to be a major concern oi.  these types of
projects, the results of this study suggest  that the Bank could benefit by
hiring people with specialized educational  backgrounds and experience for the
CODs and P8M divisions.  An appropriate educational  background for this type
of work would entail a Ph.D. in a social science dircipline other than
economics--whether  public admt.nistration,  political science, sociology,  or
anthropology--with  some focus on development and some exposure to issues  of
public  administration.  Training to the Ph.D. level is useful to insure broad
abilities In conceptual  thinking.
Institutional staff in the Country Departments (CDs)  would have a
broader role than those in the Technical Departments (TDs),  because the former
would need to manage a wide array  of ID-oriented  tasks.  Therefore, PSH staff
in the TDs would be expected to be more experienced and specialized  than staff
in the CDs.  The relevant experience  would depend on the needs of the region,
whether debt management, tax administration,  public expenditure  management,
civil service reform, public enterprise reform, etc.  Specialized experience
is no less  important  in these  areas than in the s*ctors--although  it  may be
more difficult  to find.  If  there is concern for long-term  fungibility of the
specialized  staff, they could be hired on fixed-term appointments.
These recommendations follow from our view that there is an identifiable
body of knowledge  and experience that constitutes an "ID specialty".
Understanding the nature of organizations and bureaucracies has been a field
of academic endeavor and practical application for  many years.  Approaches and
instruments  have been developed, and lessons have been learned.  For example,
specialists in this field have studied  the implications  of line and staff
relations,  of different forms  of hierarchy, of centralization vs.
decentralization, and of various authority/responsibility  mixes.  They have
developed various management systems and have studied  the advantages and
disadvantages  of each.  They have been concerned  with policy makers' access to
important information,  and have developed systems  to permit the most
widespread and efficient flow  of such information.  In particular, an ID
specialist  brings to bear a heightened sensitivity  to the organizational
milieu and incentive systems in the public sector.
2.  TRAINING
A sensitivity  to ID concerns and approaches--at least  enough to know
when to hire experts--can  be learned  through short-term  training.  More and
better formal  opportunities for  training in institutional  issues are needed
for non-specialist Bank staff.  These should include  not only more short
courses (such  as those organized by CECPS), but also professional conferences
and longer courses given by outside organizations,  whether governments in
industrial or developing countries, specialized  associations  that deal with
public administration,  or business or public policy schools in the U.S. or
abroad.  Lxternal secondments to public or private-sector organizations should
also be encouraged, particularly for staff (such  as  Young Professionals)  who
may not have had significant  prior work experience  before joining the Bank.26
Work Assiaments
In  addition to  our  observations on  organizational  structure and
personnel policies, our study of 84 Bank projects led us to believe that the
ID impact  of Bank projects could be enhanced by some reconsideration  of work
assignments.  First, to  insure  that economic analysis ia accompanied by
relevant institutional and political analysis and to facilitate on-the-Job
training  in  theme areas, it  is useful to adopt more of  a team approach--to
team people with different backgrounds and team less  experienced with more
experienced  people.  In many cases this will  mean designing SALs and TALe
jointlyl indeed,  a  strong case can be made that every SAL should be
accompanied  by  a  TAL  to insure thal institutional  requirements for
*ustainability  are  not  overlooked  T  The  incentives  that  currently  exist  in
the  Bank  to  subdivide  work  into  a  myriad  of  discrete  tasks  that  people  manage
and  carry  out  separately  can  be  counterproductive.
Second,  good  ID  work  takes  an  in-depth  knowledge  of  a  country and
careful  negotiation  with  many  people,  all  of  which  takes  time.  Projects  with
thorny  institutional  issues  should  not  be rushed  to  the  Board.
Third, even if the  treatment  of ID in project  design  is  excellent,  a
project can fail in its ID objectives because of poor implementation.  We
believe that the task manager in the design stage of the project cycle should
continue to manage a project into the supervision  stage as long as possible.
Accountability for implementation  should be encouraged  by taking supervision
activities--as  well as the results  of project completion  reports--into account
when evaluating staff.  Unfortunatelv.  we were re2eatedly  told that no
incentives  exist  in  the  Bank  for  cood  ou22ervision--that  the incentives  stopped
once a oroiect  was taken to the Board.  Responsibilitv for Proiect outcomes
aooearr to be very weak.
Finally,  policies on staff rotation can enhance institutional
understanding if they encourage more country and regional specialization.
Because of the key role that country knowledge and experience play in the
understanding of institutions,  the Bank should  encourage longer times-in-
assignment (perhaps  five years rather than three), particularly in the case of
its larger and more complex borrowers.  Furthermore, the Bank should  encourage
regional specialization  across assignmerts, because of the many institutional
similarities  between countries within a region or subregion.
14  The reverse is  not true.  Stand-alone  TALa are  often appropriate in  the
absence  of  any  economic  adjustment  program. Furthermore,  the  preparation  of  TALs
should not be rushed simply to fit in the time-frame of a hurried SAL.  Both
loans should be based on a thorough analysis of institutional capacities and
needs.27
conclusion
The best institutional  work in the Bank in done where managers are the
most committed to ID goals.  Managers can enhance the quality of the Bank's ID
work by giving clear signals--through  policy papers, speeches, and (most
importantly)  reviews of individual  loans--that ID is important, indeed
paramount, to the Bank's mission of promoting development.  OED iL already
leading  the way with its constant stress on the importance  of institutional
work to project *ustainability.
This study ham focused  on the treatment of institutional issues in
project design.  While project design is critical, the weakest link in the
Bank's ID  work may be in implementation.  We know a lot now about the effects
of the Bank's organization, staffing,  and incentive structure on its
institutional  work; we will know even more if these 84 projects can be
revisited in a follow-up study in five to ten years.PRE  Workin 9 Paper  Sories
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